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ABSTRACT
This paper deals with the reform to labor market regulation implemented by Chile during
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wage bargaining process, and on the reduction in payroll taxes.  Our interest is to understand to what
extent these reforms helped reduce Chile’s rate of unemployment from “European” to “U.S” levels.
We argue that the reduction of payroll taxes (within the context of the social security reform), and
the decentralization of bargaining increased labor market flexibility and contributed to the reduction
of unemployment. Our analysis suggests that the reform on job security had no significant effect on
the aggregate rate of unemployment.
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Most countries that embraced the economic reform agenda during the last decade
found out that the road to market-orientation was bumpier than expected.  In many cases
macroeconomic stability has been elusive, growth has been timid and social conditions
have not improved significantly.  This has been the case in virtually every region in the
world, including in Central and Eastern Europe.  Faced with this reality, policy makers,
academics and analysts have searched for examples of successful reforms and for lessons
of experience.  Chile has possibly amassed the most successful economic record among
reforming economies during the last decade.  GDP growth averaged 7.2% per year during
1988-1997, unemployment declined from almost 20% in the early 1980s to 6% in 1996-
97, real wages grew at a rate that exceeded 5% per year during 1988-97, and, after a long
history of macroeconomics disequilibria, inflation reached the 5% range in 1997-98.
1
See Figure 1 for the evolution of these variables during 1984-1997.
Starting in the mid-1970s, and under the aegis of a dictatorial military regime led
by General Augusto Pinochet, Chile’s economy underwent a profound market-oriented
reform process.  The major elements of the Chilean modernization program were:
2
•   A sweeping tax reform aimed at eliminating major distortions, taming the fiscal
deficit, and achieving macroeconomic equilibrium.
•   The (unilateral) opening up of international trade through the elimination of
quantitative restrictions and the adoption of a 10% uniform import tariff.
•   A major privatization program, that covered most (but not all) areas of the economy.
The state, for instance, maintained ownership of the national copper company
(CODELCO), as well as other large public enterprises.
•   A deep financial reform that deregulated the domestic capital market, and allowed
relatively free entry into the banking sector.
•   A reform of labor market regulations aimed at increasing labor market flexibility and
reducing the degree and intensity of labor conflicts.
                                                          
1  During 1998-99, and partially as a result of the East Asian crisis, the rate of growth of real GDP declined
significantly, and unemployment increased above the 10% level.
2 On the Chilean reforms see, for example, Edwards and Edwards (1991) and the essays in Bosworth et al
(1994).2
•   The privatization of social security.
Chile’s experience with market-oriented reforms has attracted considerable
attention among policy makers and analysts throughout the world.  For instance, many
participants in the debate on the future of the social security system in the United States
have referred to the Chilean experience with admiration.  The political economy of the
Chilean reforms has also been a subject of considerable analysis. Also, many analysts
have noted that in spite of the depth of the reforms, Chile maintained a somewhat
pragmatic attitude towards capital mobility.  Both during the military regime as well as
during the democratically administrations that followed, Chile imposed restrictions on the
free mobility of short-term capital, while encouraging direct foreign investment.  In the
aftermath of the Mexican, East Asian, Russian and Brazilian currency crises this policy
towards capital flows has attracted considerable attention and some analysts, including
senior officials at the World Bank, have argued that most emerging markets should
contemplate adopting some version of it.
3
One of Chile’s most remarkable achievements during the last fifteen years – and,
paradoxically, one that has received very little attention in the professional literature – is
the reform of labor market regulations.
4  Two major reforms were undertaken in an effort
to modernize labor relations, reduce labor market distortions and increase labor market
flexibility. The first reform was implemented in the early 1980s by the military regime.
The second reform was implemented during the early 1990s by the first democratic
government.  Chile’s labor market reforms covered three areas:
•   Employment protection legislation was reformed in an effort to increase the
degree of labor market “flexibility.”  From a practical pint of view this reform
imposed a ceiling on the maximum severance payment a dismissed worker
was entitled to.
                                                          
3   It is questionable, however, whether these controls have been effective.  See Edwards (1999).
4   The Brookings volume on the Chilean experience edited by Bosworth et al (1994) does not have a
chapter on labor reforms.  Our own book includes a chapter on the subject, but only covers developments
until 1985.  Gruber (1997) is one of the few recent pieces in the English language devoted to the subject.
Edwards (1995), Edwards (1996) and IDB (1996) discuss Chile’s labor reforms within a broader Latin
American context.3
•   Legislation on collective bargaining was modified.  The goal of this reform
was to reduce the power of unions, and increase the degree of decentralization
of the bargaining process.
•   Payroll taxes were reduced.  This measure was undertaken within the context
of a major social security reform that replaced an insolvent “pay-as-you-go”
system with a privately managed, full capitalization regime.
What makes this experience particularly interesting is that between 1983-85 and 1993-95,
Chile went from rates of unemployment usually associated with some European
countries, to unemployment rates similar to those traditionally prevailing in the U.S.
While during 1983-85 the open rate of unemployment averaged 17.3%, by 1993-95 it had
declined to 5.8 percent.  And all of this while real wages experienced rates of growth in
excess of 5% per year.
5
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the way in which Chile’s market oriented
reforms affected labor market outcomes, and in particular aggregate unemployment.  Our
discussion centers on the changes introduced to labor market regulations during the
military regime and during the first democratic government.  An important aim of our
analysis is to provide lessons of experience for countries – both emerging and advanced –
that are contemplating reforming their economic structures and moving towards greater
market orientation.  In order to provide the appropriate background for the discussion, the
starting point of our analysis is the early 1970s, when the administration of President
Salvador Allende attempted to build an economic system based on socialist principles.
We then deal with the main labor market-related developments during the military regime
and the first democratic government of the post-Pinochet era.  We analyze in detail
specific aspects of the reforms to labor legislation, including changes dealing with
employment protection legislation, and the role of labor unions.  Throughout the paper we
make an effort to provide a comparison between the degree of labor market regulation in
Chile and in European countries.
                                                          
5 The initial level of wages was, however, highly depressed (Edwards and Edwards, 1991).  Also, and as
explained above, the 1998-99 emerging markets crisis resulted in a sever economic slowdown and in an
increase in the rate of unemployment.4
The paper is organized as follows: Section I is the introduction and motivates the
paper.  Section II provides an overview of Chile’s labor market during 1966-97.  We
discuss the way in which regulations evolved during this period.  In this section we use
survey data to analyze the evolution of unemployment patterns.
6  Sections III through V
deal, in great detail, with the three major components of Chile’s labor market reforms:
Section III concentrates on the reforms to job security legislation.  Section IV deals with
the reforms to collective bargaining rules and with the evolving role of unions.  In Section
V we focus on the labor market consequences of the privatization of social security. In
Section VI we use aggregate time series to analyze the effects of the reform package on
labor market flexibility.  In doing this we concentrate on their effect on the “equilibrium”
rate of unemployment and on unemployment persistence.  In this section we make an
attempt to quantify the contribution of each of the components of the labor reforms to the
reduction in long run unemployment.  Finally, Section VII contains the concluding
remarks.  The paper also has an appendix where we present a dual-labor market model to
analyze the labor market consequences of a social security reform.
II.  Labor Market Regulations and Trends in Chile:  An Overview
In this section we provide an overview of Chile’s labor markets during the last 25
years.  We start with an analysis labor regulations, including the labor market reforms of
1981 and 1990.  Next, we use survey data to discuss the evolution of some key variables,
including the rate of unemployment and participation rates.
II.1  Four Broad Phases in Chile’s Labor Legislation
Recent studies on employment regulations have tended to concentrate on:   (a)
employers’ ability to dismiss workers;  (b) the cost of severance payments; (c) the power
of unions; and (d) limitations on temporary job contracts.  Grubb and Wells (1993) and
Nickell (1997), for example, have focused on these variables in their attempt to analyze
the effect of employment regulations on labor market outcomes in the United States and
in the European Community.  Bertola (1990) used a set of indicators on job security to
                                                          
6 A discussion of the political economy of these reforms would be relevant here. However, due to space
constraints we refer the reader to Edwards and Lederman (1998); Bostworth et.al. (1994) and Piñera
(1990).5
rank OECD countries from highest labor market regulations (Italy) to lowest regulations
(the U.S.).  These rankings were then used to analyze the evolution of employment and
the wage gap in a group of ten countries.  Edwards (1995) has investigated the effects of
some of these indicators, including union prerogatives and job security legislation, on
labor market behavior in a group of Latin American countries.
Based on the behavior of these indicators, and as it will become apparent in the
sections that follow, it is possible to divide Chile’s recent labor market history into four
distinct phases:
7
•   The first phase, spanning from 1966 through 1973,
8 corresponds to an era of
increasing government intervention and regulations.  This policy stance achieved its
peak in 1970-73 during the administration of socialist President Salvador Allende.
During the first three months of the Allende government the legal minimum wage was
raised, through a Presidential decree, by 56 percent.
9  This period was characterized
by the massive nationalization of private sector companies, an expanding
macroeconomic disequilibrium and growing political unrest.  Inflation increased
rapidly, and by 1973 real wages had declined significantly (see Dornbusch and
Edwards 1990, for details).
•   The second phase corresponds to the early years of the military regime and covers the
period 1974-1979.  During this period, and largely for politically repressive reasons,
union activity was suppressed.  From a legal standpoint, however, no significant
reforms to labor legislation were introduced. During this period Chile was affected by
a steep decline in terms of trade, that led to a major recession in 1975. Unemployment
climbed to unprecedented levels, and the military government implemented a
temporary public works program – known as the Minimum Employment Program
                                                          
7 Edwards (1999) and Mizala (1998), among others, have proposed a similar classification scheme for this
period.
8   We date the beginning of this era on 1966 for two reasons:  first, and as we discuss in section III of this
paper, in that year a stringent legislation severely limiting workers dismissals was enacted.  Second, 1966 is
the first year for which there are aggregate nation-wide data on employment and unemployment in Chile.
9   This type of increase was, of course not sustainable.  By the second quarter of 1973, and in spite of the
government’s effort, inflation had eroded real minimum wages very significantly.  By that time the
minimum wage was, in real terms, 20 percent below its 1970 level.  For an analysis of the Allende
experience see, for example, Dornbusch and Edwards (1990) and Larrain and Meller (1991).6
(MEP) – as a way of combating it.  This period comes to an end in 1980 with the
enactment of the military’s labor reform, popularly known in Chile as the Labor Plan.
•   The third phase covers the years 1980-90 and corresponds to the last ten years of the
military regime.  Throughout these years labor relations were governed by the newly
approved Labor Plan.  During this period the overall effort to modernize the Chilean
economy continued, with the privatization of social security becoming one of the
most important reforms undertaken at this time. During this phase Chile was again
affected by a major recession, as the 1982-83 debt crisis resulted in a deep decline in
output and a major hike in unemployment.
•   The fourth and final phase corresponds to 1991-1998, and covers the democratically
elected administrations of Presidents Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) and Eduardo Frei
Ruiz-Tagle (1994-2000).  During the first year of this phase a new reform to labor
legislation was implemented.  Employment protection was increased and unions’
were given a greater role in the collective bargaining process.  The new democratic
governments, however, made an effort to maintain a “flexible” labor code.
10
In terms of the intensity of “rigidities,” these periods can be ranked as follows: The
period 1966-73 was the most restrictive (with 1970-73 being particularly distortive).  The
second most restrictive period is 1974-79 when job protection legislation maintained its
traditional features while mandated wage indexation was in place.  Next comes 1990-97,
a period of significantly fewer restrictions, in turn followed (closely) by the least
restrictive 1980-89 period.  In the rest of this paper we analyze the way in which Chile’s
labor market performed during these phases, and in particular after the labor reforms were
undertaken.
11  More specifically, we ask whether the labor market performed more
“fluently” during periods with lower restrictions.
Table 1 summarizes the evolution of the key labor market interventions during
these four periods.  This table covers four aspects of labor markets:  (a) Rules governing
collective bargaining;  (b) legislation dealing with job security;  (c) payroll taxes; and (d)
regulations affecting wage setting and wage adjustment, including indexation rules. In
                                                          
10   At the time of this writing, however, the administration of President Frei is pushing a new labor reform
that, if approved, will increase the degree of centralization of the bargaining process.
11   Pages and Montenegro (1998) make a similar classification.7
order to provide an adequate background, this table also includes information on the
historical (pre-1966) evolution of labor market regulations.
II.2  Labor Market Trends Across Periods
In this subsection we use survey data from the Universidad de Chile for the
Greater Santiago Area (GSA) to analyze unemployment trends between 1964 and 1994.
Although this is the only survey-based data set that goes back in time, the fact that it
covers only about a third of the country’s labor market is a limitation, and should be kept
in mind when interpreting the results.  The survey takes place in June of each year, and
contains information on labor market participation and employment during the week
preceding the survey, and wages received during the month of May.  The GSA is
predominantly urban, with a concentration in services.  Figure 2 contains the rate of
unemployment and estimated mean duration of unemployment for the GSA area.  Both
the 1975 and 1982 increases in unemployment were associated with major recessions that
reduced GDP growth significantly below its long-term trend.  After 1982, there was a
steady reduction of the unemployment rate until it reached historical levels in the early
1990s.  The estimated mean unemployment duration rises from around 8 weeks in the
period 1964-73, to around 12.5 weeks in the period 1974-78, and to 14.8 weeks in the
period 1979-90 reaching 23.5 weeks in 1983.
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III. Reforms to Job Security Legislation
As in most of Latin America, Chile’s traditional labor legislation provided ample
degree of employment protection.  With time, job security had become so high that it was
very difficult for firms to adjust to external shocks or to changes in relative prices.  In
fact, since the mid-1960s it had become extremely difficult for firms to dismiss workers
under virtually any circumstances.  Moreover, this legislation had increased the total cost
of hiring labor, encouraging firms to adopt technologies that were relatively more capital
intensive (Edwards and Edwards 1991).  One of the explicit goals of the 1980 labor
reform was to reverse this trend, by reducing the cost of dismissing workers – while still
providing some minimum degree of job security.  It was expected that by reforming the8
legislation on job security, firms would have a greater ability to adapt to new external
circumstances.  In this section we discuss, in some detail, Chile’s reforms to job security
protection, and we evaluate the extent to which this aspect of the reform was able to
achieve its goals.
III.1  Job Security legislation in the 1960s and early 1970s
Chile has traditionally used three tools to provide employment security:
•   Advanced notice to workers in case of impending dismissal.  Throughout our period
of interest firms had to give a one-month advance notice.
•   Limitations to the use of fixed-term labor contracts;
•   Severance payments in case of dismissal.  The extent of this last instrument was
severely changed in the labor reforms of 1980 and 1990.
  Job security legislation was introduced in 1966 with the approval of the so-called
“Immobility Law” or “Ley de Inamovilidad.”  Until 1966, the “employment at will”
doctrine prevailed, although there was a significant distinction in the law between white
collar and blue-collar workers.  Employers could dismiss blue-collar workers without
expression of cause, with advance notice or, alternatively, by making a payment equal to
one month wages.  White-collar workers would receive a severance payment
(“desahucio”) which was a function of their salary and length of tenure. The 1966 law
established the principle of “just cause,” which included “grave faults” such as criminal
behavior and absenteeism, and the “economic need” of the firm.  The law gave workers
the right to appeal a dismissal in Court, and if the Labor Court determined the dismissal
to be lack “just cause”, the worker had to be reinstated to his/her job.  If in such case, the
employer refused to reinstate the worker, the judge would order the employer to pay a
severance equivalent to no less than one monthly wage per year of service.  There was no
upper limit to this severance payment.  While the legislation contemplated economic
reasons among “just causes,” in practice, and with time, labor courts tended not to
consider economic or financial reasons as “justified,” increasing very significantly the
cost of dismissals to the firm.
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
12 The methodology used to produce an estimate of the mean duration of unemployment is presented in9
  III.2 Reforms to Job Security Under the Military Regime
  Between 1973 and 1979 the military regime took a piece meal approach towards
job security legislation.  Possibly, the most important change during this period was that
labor courts became more sympathetic to firms’ claims, de facto reducing the extent of
employment protection.  Furthermore, in March of 1975, the military government added
politically-related causes to “just dismissal.”   These included taking part in illegal
stoppages or strikes, delinquent activities, and infringement of the law on arms controls.
  In 1978 the Pinochet administration abolished the distinctions between blue and
white collar workers, and established that all workers dismissed for “unjustified reasons”
were subject to a severance payment equivalent to one monthly wage per year of service,
with no upper limit on the total amount to be paid.
  It was not until the Labor Plan of 1980 that job security legislation was amended
in a significant way.  This new legislation continued to treat all workers – blue and white
collar – alike, and established that, in general, the nature of severance payment would
become part of the overall job contract, with its level and other characteristics being
negotiated by the employee and the employer.
13 However, according to the reform, the
severance package agreed upon by employees and employers could not be lower than one
monthly wage per year of service, with a maximum of five months.
14  This minimum
severance payment would be legally in effect in the absence of an explicit agreement
between the parties.  In June of 1984, the Pinochet regime established that the firm’s
economic or financial needs did not constitute a “just cause” for dismissal, and that those
workers laid off for those reasons were subject to the same severance package as other
workers (See Table 1 for details).
  III.3  Reforms to Job Security Introduced by the First Democratic Government in 1990
  In December 1990 the Aylwin government labor reform went into effect (Law
19,010).  This reform modified the norms on dismissals without “just cause” along five
lines:  (1) It reinstated the notion of dismissals with “economic cause”, maintaining the
legal severance at thirty days wages per each year of service, but raised the maximum
                                                                                                                                                                            
Ureta (1998).
 
13   This new provision applied only to contracts signed after August 1981.  See Law 18,018 for details.
 
14   In rigor, the law established a maximum of 150 days’ wages.10
package from five to eleven months’ wages.  (2) Employers that dismissed a worker
arguing “economic cause” would be liable for the legal severance, or whatever severance
was previously agreed with the worker above the legal.  The burden of proof of
“economic cause” was placed on employers, with a limit placed on the liability for failing
to provide legal proof in court.  Failure to prove economic cause would raise the legal
severance in 20%.
15  (3) The law established a separate treatment for domestic workers.
They would have the right to a severance upon separation, independently of the cause.
This severance would be the accumulated fund resulting from a monthly deposit of 4.11%
of taxable monthly wages in a savings account in the worker’s name.   (4) All workers
with tenures above six years could opt out of the job security protection, and participate
in an “unemployment fund.”   Under this system the employers make monthly
contributions of 4.11% of taxable monthly wages into an individualized account, in the
worker’s name.  If the employee leaves his job for any reason – either dismissal or
voluntarily – he/she can withdraw the amount that has accumulated in the fund.  And (5),
the politically motivated causes for dismissal, introduced by the military in 1975, were
abolished.
  III.4  The Cost of Job Security Legislation in Chile.   
  Neither the 1980 nor the 1990 reforms tried to change the fact that severance
payments increased with tenure.  The reforms set a ceiling to the maximum severance to
be paid, and changed the role played by Labor Courts. The 1980 reform established a
severance-ceiling equal to five monthly wages, while the 1990 reform increased that
ceiling to 11 monthly wages. Tenure-related severance schemes have, in principle, two
effects on labor market incentives.  First, they will tend to discourage firings; more
specifically, they will discourage firings of longer tenured workers.  Second, they will
discourage hiring. The net effect on labor market outcomes – and in particular on the
aggregate rate of unemployment – is, in principle, ambiguous.  Alvarez and Veracierto
(1999), for example, have developed a general equilibrium model where higher
employment protection will reduce the incidence of unemployment, but will increase its
duration.  The net effect on the rate of unemployment will depend on the specific
                                                          
15     Using the same principle of establishing a limited liability, failure to prove “just cause” would oblige11
parameters of the model.  In their specific simulation, an increase of severance payments
from 3 to 12 monthly wages reduces the aggregate rate of unemployment.
  A number of authors have tried to construct indexes that capture the costs of job
security schemes.  While some authors have constructed cross-country comparative
indexes (Grubb and Wells 1993, Lazear 1990), others have calculated the way in which
dismissal costs evolve through time in a particular country (see Bentolila 1997 for an
application to the case of Spain).  In this paper we use a methodology recently proposed
by Pages and Montenegro (1999) to construct an index of the costs of job security
legislation in Chile.  According to these authors’ the cost of employment protection
legislation can be summarized by the following expression:
 
(1)  Ct  =  Σ  β
I δ
I-1 (1 - δ ) (b + a S
j
 t+I + (1 – a) S
u
t+I) .
Where β  is the discount factor, δ  is the probability of remaining in the same job, δ
I-1 (1 -
δ ) is the probability of dismissal after i years, b is the cost of advance notice (one monthly
wage, throughout the period under analysis), a is the probability that the courts will admit
economic distress as a “just” cause, S
j
 t+I is the payment under justified cause, and S
u
t+I is
the payment under unjustified dismissal.   In the actual computation of this index we
considered eight different time periods:  (1)  Pre-1966, when the “employment at will”
doctrine prevailed, and the one month advance notice constituted the only restriction to
dismissals.  (2)  The 1966-1969 period, when courts, firms and workers were learning to
operate under the new job security law of 1966.  During this period courts were not
completely unsympathetic towards firms’ economic needs.  (3)  The 1970-73 period,
when social and political conflict in Chile increased significantly.  During this period
courts rarely sided with firms in adjudicating labor conflicts.  (4) 1974-77, a period
corresponding to the early years of the military regime.  During these years courts leaned
towards firms.  (5)  1978-80, when the probability of economic distress being considered
a “just cause” (parameter a, in equation 1), became even higher.  (6) 1981-84,
corresponding to the first years of the military labor plan.  (7) The period 1985-1990,
                                                                                                                                                                            
the employer to pay the legal severance (for economic cause) augmented in 50%.12
when economic distress was eliminated as “just cause”. (8) And 1991-1997,
corresponding to the democratic labor reform.
16  Figure 3 depicts the evolution of this
index through time.  As may be seen, it captures the important changes in labor protection
legislation during the period under study.
17  The liberalization of labor markets during
1980-90 is clearly reflected by the index, as is the increase in employment protection
implemented by the 1990 reform.  In order to have alternative measures of the cost of
dismissal, we also computed what would be the expected cost to a firm of dismissing
workers with ten and twenty year tenure.  We called those indexes, Cost_ten and
Cost_twenty, respectively.  All three indexes are highly correlated; when measured in
logs, their correlation coefficients range from 0.94 to 0.97.
As our Security Index in Figure 3 clearly shows, by the early 1990s the cost of
Chile’s employment protection laws was significantly lower than what it had reached in
the 1970-73 period.  An interesting question, however, is how does Chile’s job security
legislation compares internationally.  This issue is addressed in Table 2, where Chile’s
employment protection legislation in the early 1990s is compared to that of 36 countries
from all over the world.
18   The basic data in this table are taken from a recent paper by
Marquez and Pages (1998), where Grubb and Wells (1993) methodology is used to rank
countries according to the degree of restrictivenness of six aspects of job security
legislation.  The most restrictive country in a given category is given a ranking equal to 1;
the less restrictive one is given a ranking equal to 37.  The following features of job
security legislation are considered:  (1) Cause for dismissal: This ranks countries
according to the likelihood that economic distress will be considered a just cause for
dismissal.  (2) Tenure-based severance at 3 years.  This ranks countries according to the
expected cost to the firm of dismissing a worker with 3 years of tenure.  (3) Probationary
                                                          
16   The actual parameters used to construct the job security index are available from the author on request.
17   The main difference between our index and that of Pages and Monetenegro (1999) is that we explicitly
take into account the court’s change of attitude in the 1969-73 period.  That is, in our computations,
parameter “a” takes a different value than in theirs.  In order to have some comparability with their work,
we deliberately used the values that they assigned to the other parameters in equation (1).  In that sense, our
index could be called a “revised Pages-Montenegro index.”
18   In addition to Chile, the following countries are included in the sample:  Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados,
Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad, Uruguay,13
period: ranks countries according to the length of the probation period.  (4) Severance at
20 years.  Ranks countries according to the expected cost to the firm of dismissing a
worker with a 20 year tenure.  (5)  Reinstatement.  Asks whether firms have to reinstate
workers that, according to the courts, have been unjustly dismissed.  (6)  Overall index of
restrictiveness.  In Table 2, the actual numbers for “Rest of Latin America” and “Selected
European Countries” corresponds to the median ranking for that specific group of
countries reported in Marquez and Pages (1998).  The most interesting aspect of this table
is that, in spite of the reforms of the last two decades, Chile’s job security legislation
continues to be – at least from an international comparative perspective – rather
restrictive.
19
  Several empirical studies have tried to measure the effect of  job security
legislation on labor market outcomes.  Bentolila’s and Saint Paul’s (1992) use a “before
and after” approach to analyze the Spanish case.  They show that labor demand fluctuated
more in response to output shocks after flexible employment rules were adopted.
Houseman (1991) uses data from Western Europe steel plants and offers evidence that
more restrictive policy on severance slowed hiring.  Dertouzos and Karoly (1990) use
USA data to show that state exceptions to the employment at will doctrine reduce
employment.  Lazear (1990) used a similar research design on a panel of countries to
show that more generous severance pay reduces employment.  A recent study by Pages
and Montenegro (1999) used Chilean data from 1960 to 1997 to evaluate the effect of
changes on job security legislation on employment, unemployment and rates of
participation.  They find that tenure-based job security reduces long-run aggregate
employment rates, particularly through the effect on youth employment.  However,
because the reduction in youth employment coincides with a reduction in labor force
participation among the youth, there is no visible impact on unemployment.  They argue
that, a flat severance pay would have little effect on youth employment or on aggregate
                                                                                                                                                                            
Venezuela, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the
United Kingdom and the U.S.
19   Rank indexes of this type are subject to a number of limitations, including the fact that they fail to
incorporate the fact that the cost of job protection legislation tends to affect the incentives that firms and
workers have to reach enforceable agreements privately.  For this reason, these indexes should be
interpreted with care.14
employment or unemployment.  In Section VI of this paper we use our indexes on the
costs of job security legislation to investigate the effect that this particular labor reform
had on Chile’s aggregate unemployment rate.
 
IV. The Role of Unions and Collective Bargaining
One of the fundamental goals of Chile’s labor reforms was to drastically change
the nature of the collective bargaining process.  In the early 1970s labor relations had
become seriously strained: on the one hand, unions had become highly combative and
politicized; on the other, the private sector had been taking an increasingly anti-labor
stance.  The conflict between unions and the private sector had reached its peak during
the Allende administration, when many unions used force to size the companies where
they worked, giving the government an excuse for nationalizing them.  Immediately after
the military coup unions’ rights were suppressed.  It was not until 1979, and under
pressure from the US, that the Pinochet regime decided to reinstate unions’ rights.  At
that time, however, it became evident that the old legislation was not adequate any longer,
and that a new legal framework was required.  This was exactly the aim of the so-called
Labor Plan of 1980.  In this section we discuss the military (and subsequent) reform to
collective bargaining legislation, and we discuss the extent to which its goals were
achieved.
IV.1  Some Background on Chile’s Collective Bargaining Legislation
The rules governing collective bargaining in Chile were first established in the
labor code of 1931, and throughout the years evolved in the direction of giving unions
increased power.  At the time of the military coup in 1973, the main features of the
collective bargaining process were the following:
•   The government was actively involved in the negotiation process, through the so-
called Tripartite Commissions.
•   Union membership was obligatory for workers employed in any firm that had a union.
The creation of a union required the approval of 55% of workers in a firm.
•   Unions could decide whether to negotiate at the level of each individual firm, or at the
industry level.  By 1973 the vast majority of unions negotiated at the industry level.15
•   Legal strikes could be called if a number of steps – including arbitration – had failed.
Strikes length was indefinite. By 1973, however, many unions staged illegal strikes or
stoppages as a way to pressure management into giving up to their demands.
•   Lockout practices were severely restricted, and once a legal strike was started the firm
could not hire replacement workers.  Since unions could strike indefinitely, this latter
provision could be particularly costly to firms.  Moreover, unions usually demanded
the payment of wages forgone during the strike as a precondition for returning to
work.
•   There were a number of laws that established especial rules for specific industries.
This trend started as early as 1956, when workers in the copper industry (the country’s
main export) were granted unique privileges.
•   Many trades required, by law, membership in the industry wide unions – the so-called
Professional Unions.  These provisions applied to barbers, TV announcers, teachers,
bus drivers, among others, and established serious barriers to entry.
Between the early 1960s and 1973 the rate of unionization increased rapidly from
11% of total employed workers, to almost 37% in 1973.  At that time the rate of
unionization exceeded 85% in the mining sector, 60% in manufacturing and 50% in the
utilities sectors (Feres 1997).  During the first years of the military regime the government
played an increasing role in the bargaining process and, in particular, in wage
determination. For example, staring in  July of 1975, the government imposed a de facto
system of backward-looking wage indexation.
IV.2  The Military’s “Labor Plan”
In 1979, and under significant international pressure, the military decided to allow
free union participation within the context of a new set of labor laws.
20  Three pieces of
legislation approved in mid 1979 established new norms on the constitution of unions,
and determined their rights and obligations.  These decrees also dealt with the
constitution of employers’ organizations, and with norms governing collective
bargaining.
21 With the military labor reform, the “closed shop” requirement was
                                                          
20   Piñera (1990) provides a fascinating account of the process leading to the labor reforms.
21 This new legislation replaced Title II of Book IV of the 1931 Labor Code which, ironically, was titled
“Collective Conflicts.”16
eliminated, union affiliation within a firm became voluntary, and all negotiations had to
be conducted at the firm level.  An important goal of these reforms was to contain (most
of) the costs of a labor conflict to the two parties directly involved in the bargaining
process.  For example, it stipulated that in the absence of a new collective agreement, the
old contract would continue to be in effect while negotiations proceeded.  Employers’
new contract offer would have to contain a wage adjustment that matched accumulated
inflation.  The new contract, or a substitute one with the same condition, would enter into
effect unless workers called a strike.  For a strike to be called, the law required the
approval of the absolute majority of the workers represented.  In case of a strike, a firm
could impose a lockout and temporarily lay off workers, a step the previous law had
explicitly prohibited.  In contrasts with the old legislation, the new law allowed workers
to take other jobs, and employers could hire temporary replacements.  Individual workers
could abandon the negotiation and return to work after 30 days of strike, and employers
were obliged to take them back into their, at a wage rate fully adjusted by the rate of
inflation that had accumulated since the previous contract.   The continuation of a strike
over 60 days was considered as voluntary resignation from the job.
IV.3  Unions and the Labor Reform of the First Democratic Government
New laws on unions’ rights and collective bargaining went into effect in February
and August of 1991.  The new legislation did not depart significantly from the framework
established in 1980.  However, the prohibition of negotiations above the firm level, or the
prohibition to cover certain themes in collective bargaining were abolished. Trade unions
and worker’s associations were given the right to bargain with more than one employer.
The new law eliminated the 60 days period for the legal strike, which allowed employers
to dismiss striking workers without severance after the 60 days period.  The new law also
reinstated stricter conditions for workers replacements in case of strike, which had been
eroded with the amendment of article 26 of the previous law in 1982.
22
                                                                                                                                                                            
22  Article 157 of Law 19069 established that, the employer could hire replacement workers from the first
day of initiated the strike, only if the last offer contained the same conditions of the previous contract
adjusted by cost of living increases.  In such case, workers could return to their jobs from the fifteenth day
of initiated the strike.  If the last offer had not fulfill the conditions mentioned above, employers could hire
replacements from he fifteenth day of initiated the strike, and workers could return to their jobs after thirty
days of initiated the strike.17
IV.4  Quantifying the Extent of Chile’s Reform to Collective Bargaining: Comparative
and Time Series Perspectives
The basic goal of the reforms on collective bargaining, was to reduce the cost of
disputes, reduce the power of unions, decentralize negotiations, and bring the parties
quickly into agreement.  In a way, the objective of the reform was to move collective
bargaining away from the more centralized European tradition, and closer to the
decentralized United Stated model.  To a large extent this goal of the reforms was
achieved.  In Table 3 we present an explicit comparison between some important features
of Chile’s collective bargaining legislation, with the same features in a selected group of
European countries and the U.S.  The first variable in this table is the degree of union
density, or percentage of the labor force that belongs to a union.  The second is an index
that measures the degree of centralization of the bargaining process.  The index goes from
1 to 3, and a higher number depicts a more centralized process.  The indexes for Europe
and the U.S. are taken from a recent paper by Flanagan (1999); this is also the source for
the other indexes in this table.
23 The values of the indexes for Chile were determined by
us, after analyzing the evolution of collective bargaining legislation in Chile during the
period under analysis.
24  The third index in the table captures the degree of bargaining
coordination across unions, firms and the government.  The index goes from 1 to 3, with
a higher number denoting greater coordination.  The fourth index measures the extent to
which union federations are actively involved in the bargaining process.  A higher
number depicts a higher degree of involvement.  Finally, the fifth index measures
government involvement in collective bargaining.  A value of 1 refers to minimum
involvement, a higher number is an indication of a more active government (see the notes
to the table for details).  The data in Table 3 capture quite eloquently the drastic change
experienced by Chile’s collective bargaining process.  Labor unions became less
important, and the process itself became more decentralized.  Moreover, the government,
                                                          
23  The following European countries are included by Flanagan (1999) in his study:  Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the U.K.
The numbers in table x correspond to the median index for these countries.  Table 1 in Flanagan (1999)
contains individual data for each one of these countries.
24   For the earlier period we relied on Barria (1971 a, b)18
which until 1979 had played a key role in labor negotiations, was completely taken out of
the process.
As Flanagan (1999, p.1172) has pointed out, data on union density can provide a
misleading picture of the nature of industrial relations.  The problem is that these data say
very little, if anything, on the “intensity of union influence…[or] bargaining power.”  In
that regard, data on actual number and intensity of strikes provide important
complementary information.  According to the ILO (1994), the level of labor conflicts in
Chile in the early 1990s was equivalent to just one fifth of the levels in the period 1966-
70.  Furthermore, according to this study, during the period 1990-93, the losses associated
to strikes corresponded to an average of 1 hour of work per year.  This would put Chile’s
conflict levels below those of most developed countries. In 1996, out of 1,584 registered
negotiations, 183 made use of a strike –that is 11.5 percent of the cases.  This percentage
has been falling since 1986, when it reached 12.5 percent.   The average duration of
strikes has fallen from 25 days in 1985 to 10 days in 1996.  The number of worker-days
lost per strike fell from around 750 thousand in 1991 to about 250 thousand in 1996.  All
of these indicators suggest that strikes are a last resort recourse.
Table 4 presents some aspects of strike activity in Chile during 1960-1996.  In
order to sharpen the discussion we have included data on three periods: (a) 1960-70,
which corresponds to the pre reform era, characterized by rigid and combative legislation.
(b) The years 1985-1989, which correspond to a period when the new labor legislation
was in effect, but the country was still ruled by the military.  And (c), the 1990-96 period,
which corresponds to a post-reform-but-democratic era.  The first two columns refer to
the number of legal strikes.  As may be seen, from column1, during the post-reform but
democratic period, the total number of strikes peaked in 1992 and has since declined
steadily.  Moreover, in every one of these years the number of strikes has been lower than
in the pre reform period.  This fact is particularly impressive if one considers that these
figures refer to the absolute number of strikes.  When these data are adjusted by
employment (column 2), they are even more impressive.  During 1960-70 there were, on
average, 9.9 strikes per 100,000 employed workers per year; by 1994-96 that number had
declined to 3.6 strikes per 100,000 employed workers per year.  What is particularly19
important is to notice that during 1994-96, this decline in strike activity took place as real
wages were growing at 4.2% per year.  Another interesting aspect of column (1) is that it
shows that once democracy was re-established in 1990, the number of strikes increased
very significantly in relation to its level during 1985-89.  This drastic change provides
some evidence that during the even after the labor Law was enacted in 1980, unions felt
inhibited, and did not push the bargaining process all the way to the strike level.  Column
(3) deals with the number of days of work lost by strikers, as a consequence of strikes.
This is an (indirect) measure of the economic costs of strikes.  As may be seen, with the
exception of 1991 (the first full year of democratic rule), the number of days of work lost
was lower in the post-reform-but-democratic period than in 1960-70.  Column (4) on the
average duration of strikes, also shows a marked decline in the 1990-96, relative to the
1960-70 period.  All in all, the evidence presented here provides some strong evidence
that after the return of democracy, the collective bargaining system has been relatively
more effective than in the pre-reform era.  The number of strikes has declined, as has
their length and the average number of days of work lost by strikers.
In order to gain further insights on the evolution of Chile’s collective bargaining
process through time, we constructed two indexes.  The first one attempts to capture the
degree of decentralization of the bargaining process.  In constructing this index we
focused on the characteristics of the bargaining process emphasized by Flanagan (1999).
Unfortunately, we were only able to construct long series for three of Flanagan’s
indicators: bargaining level, federation involvement, and government involvement.  Our
Bargaining Indicator is the simple average of these three partial indexes, and can take a
value of 1 to 4;  a higher number means that the collective bargaining process is more
centralized.
25  Our second index measures the intensity of union activities, and is
constructed from ILO data on strike activities.  Our Union Index is made up of two
components:  (a)  number of strikes per year, per 100,000 workers;  and (b)  average
worker-days lost per strike.  After properly re-scaling these data from 1 to 4, the Union
Index was defined as their simple average.  It should be noticed, however, that because of
Chile’s political history both of these indexes should be interpreted with care.  In Figure 4
                                                          
25   On the historical evolution of wage bargaining in Chile we relied on Barria (1971 a,b)20
we present the evolution of our Bargaining and Union indexes.  We use these indexes in
Section V, in our effort to understand the way in which the different aspects of Chile’s
labor market reform impacted the country’s aggregate rate of unemployment.
V.  The Social Security Privatization Reform and the Labor Market
From early on, one of the objectives of the labor reforms in Chile was to reduce
the level of payroll taxes, which in the 1970s exceeded 50% of wages for low income
workers.  This, however, was a difficult task, since the bulk of the payroll taxes
corresponded to contributions to a government-run and extremely inefficient social
security system.  In 1981 the military regime decided to introduce a major social security
reform aimed at replacing the old pay-as-you-go system for a privately managed system,
based on individual retirement accounts.  The purpose of this section is to analyze the
way in which Chile’s privatization of the social security system affected labor markets. In
order to do this we develop a simple model of a segmented labor market, where as in the
case on Chile, only a fraction of workers are covered by a formal social security system.
V.1  The Privatization of Social Security:  Background
Chile’s traditional pay-as-you-go social security system was created in the 1920s,
and was characterized by very high contribution rates.  In 1973, for example, total
retirement contributions -- by employers and employees -- varied between 16 and 26
percent of wages, depending on the type of job the individual held.  Once contributions to
the national health system were added, the social security payroll tax was above 50
percent of wages for most workers.  In the absence of a connection between contributions
and perceived benefits, the social security system imposed a heavy tax burden on the
labor market during the 1960s and 1970s, and at the same time offered entitlements that
were impossible to materialize (Edwards, 1993).
In 1981, and after significant internal debate, the military government decided to
introduce a sweeping reform to the social security (retirement) system, which has been in
effect since that year, with a number of minor changes. The bases of the new system are
individual retirement accounts managed by private companies known as “Administrador-21
as de Fondos de Pensiones”, AFPs.   Each AFP can manage only one retirement fund;
likewise, each participant can have only one retirement account.
A key feature of the system is that it is mandatory for individuals working for a
formal employee.  Participants can freely decide which AFP will manage their retirement
funds, and are free to transfer their funds freely among the different management firms.
On retirement, individuals can choose to buy an annuity, or to withdraw their funds
according to a predetermined (actuarially fair) plan (Vittas 1995)
26.
Contributions to the retirement component of the system are equal to 10% of
income, compared with 26% on average in the old system.  Total contributions for
retirement, health and survivorship insurance add up to 21% of wages, with a cap
achieved once wages reach the equivalent to US$40,000 per year.  A detailed and modern
regulatory framework -- enforced by an institution especially created for this purpose, the
Superintendency of AFPs -- regulates investment portfolios, ensures free determination of
fees and commissions and free entry into the industry.
Self-employed workers are not required to participate in the system.  They have
the choice, however, to set retirement accounts which are (basically) subject to the same
regulations as those of formal sector employees.  In 1997 the percentage of active
contributors stood at 58% of those employed; in addition 4% of workers were still
contributing to the old system.  In 1997, then, the total coverage of the Chilean retirement
system amounted, then, to 62% of the labor force, approximately the same percentage as
in the traditional pay-as-you-go system.  The lack of universal is explained by two basic
factors: first, the self-employed are not legally required to participate in the system.
Second, the existence of a government-guaranteed (universal) minimum pension creates a
moral hazard situation among low income workers, many of which are self employed.
For these individuals it pays to contribute only sporadically, and only enough as to obtain
the minimum pension once they retire.
27
                                                          
26   In case an accumulated fund does not provide for an annuity above the minimum pension, the state
complements the funds, so long as the individula has made contributions for a minimum of twenty years.
27  See Edwards (1998) for details on the system’s operative aspects.22
V.2  The Pension System Reform and the Labor Market
Most analyses of social security reforms have tended to neglect the effects of the
reforms on labor markets (Siebert 1997; Lorz 1997; Gruber (1997) and Schmidt-Hebbel
1997 are some exceptions).  It is possible to argue, however, that, in principle, a pension
reform will affect the functioning of the labor market through two related channels. First,
reforms that reduce the payroll tax rate, will reduce the cost of labor and and or increase
net wages, thus, will tend to encourage employment creation and labor force
participation, ultimately rising the equilibrium level of employment.
28 
29   Second, by
relying on a capitalization system, these reforms will increase greatly the connection
between contributions and perceived benefits of the system.  That is, this type of reform
will tend to reduce the proportion of the social contribution that is perceived as a pure tax.
In this section we develop a simple model of Chile’s labor market to analyze the way in
which the social security reform affected Chile’s labor market outcomes.  Although the
model is rather simple, it has enough structure as to capture some key microeconomic
aspects of the social security reform.
Labor markets in emerging economies in general – and in Chile, in particular –, have
a number of institutional features that set them apart from labor markets in industrial
nations.  The most important among these features are:
•   In emerging countries labor markets are usually characterized by a rather large
“informal” segment.  This segment is, de facto, not directly affected by labor market
regulations, such as minimum wages, job security legislation or social security.  The
informal sector coexists with a “modern” sector, where labor market regulations are
fully in effect.  The fact that in Chile the social security system covers only 62% of
those employed, provides some evidence of the existence of this segmented structure.
Moreover, Basch and Paredes (1996) present micro-based evidence for Chile that
                                                          
28   Naturally, those reforms that increase the payroll tax will tend to have the opposite effects.
29 Gruber (1997) argued that the shift in financing of social insurance in Chile in the early 1980s did not
have important consequences for labor market efficiency.  He believes that the reduced costs of payroll
taxation to firms were fully passed on to workers in the form of higher wages, with little effect on
employment levels.  But his conclusion is unwarranted because the measured variation in wages captured in
his study was to a large extent engineered.  To encourage affiliates to move to the new system, there was a
legal mandate to pass on to workers the tax savings associated to that voluntary move (Decree Law 3,501 –
November 18
th 1980).23
supports the view that the country’s labor market is characterized by the coexistence
of these two labor segments.
30
•   Contributions to social security are often seen as a (partial) tax on labor, rather than as
deferred compensation, or an insurance program.  The percentage of the contribution
that is actually considered a pure tax depends on the nature of the social security
system and, more specifically, on the perceived connection between contributions and
benefits (Diamond and Valdes-Prieto 1994).  In the case of Chile, Torche and Wagner
(1997) have argued that, although the reform reduced the tax component of
contributions to social security, it did not fully eliminated it.
Formally, assume that, as is the case in many developing and transitional
economies, the labor market is segmented.  There is a “modern” or “covered” sector
subject to a minimum wage and to social security coverage, and an “informal” or
“unprotected” sector with no social security coverage, and competitively determined
wages.  With other things equal, workers will rather be employed in the “protected”
sector.  The problem, however, is that there are not enough jobs in that sector; individuals
that apply for a job in the modern sector face a probability (p) of obtaining it, and a
probability (1-p) of being unemployed.  In equilibrium, and under the assumption of risk
neutrality, the wage rate obtained in the informal segment is equal to the expected (take
home) wage rate in the protected sector.  We further assume that every period
employment in the modern sector turns over fully, so that the probability of getting a job
there is equal to the ratio of openings to applicants.
31
Prior to the reform workers in the protected sector are subject to a payroll tax –
whose purpose is to fund the social security system—equal to T1.  We also assume that
there is a disconnect between social security contributions and benefits.  More
specifically, we assume that social security contributions are considered by individuals to
be fully a tax (we amend this assumption in the empirical application of the model).
                                                                                                                                                                            
30   These authors use a  “break points” econometric method to determine (a) whether Chile’s labor market
is segmented, and (b) to define each segment.
31   This mechanism is similar to the one consider in migration models of the Harris-Todaro type.  In our
model, however, there is no migration.  The assumption of risk neutrality is not essential; all the results will
follow if individuals have a constant degree of risk aversion.24
Notice, however, that the analysis that follows would not be affected by the assumption
that only a fraction of the contribution was considered to be a tax.  Workers employed in
the modern sector receive a “take home” wage rate equal to the minimum wage (Wmin ).
The cost of labor to firms operating in this sector is equal to minimum wage rate plus the
payroll tax.  The social security reform will result in a reduction of this tax.  There are
two sources for this reduction: first, as was the case in Chile, the reform itself may entail
a reduction in the contribution.  Second, the replacement of the old pay-as-you-go system
by individual retirement accounts, reduces the disconnect between contributions and
benefits.  In the post reform period, at least part of the contribution will be considered as
deferred compensation
In this setting, workers prefer to be employed in the higher paying covered
sector. In equilibrium, however, the expected wage rate in the covered sector E (Wc) is
equal to the wage rate in the uncovered sector (Wn):
(2)                   Wn= E (Wc).
Assume, for simplicity, that the unemployed obtain earnings equal to zero and
that the probability of finding a job in the modern sector is equal to the ratio of openings
– that is employment in that sector (L c) – to applicants.  The latter is given by the sum of
openings plus the total number of unemployed (L c + U).
(2)  Wn  = [Lc / (Lc + U)] Wmin,
where Lc is employment in the sector covered by social security, and U is the number of
unemployed. [Lc / (Lc + U)] is, thus, the probability of being employed in the covered
sector.  The total labor force is equal to F:
(3)    Lc+Ln+U=F.
Firm’s are assumed to maximize profits, and their demand for labor in each sector
(covered and non-covered) are assumed to depend on wages and product prices:25
(4) Lc=f (Wc,Pc…)
(5)                                            Ln= g (Wn,PN...)
Pc and PN are the product prices in the covered and uncovered sectors.
The initial equilibrium is depicted in Figure 5 where curve yy is a rectangular
hyperbola, that satisfies the wage-rate equilibrium condition in equation (3). Initially,
OcL
c
0 people are employed in the protected sector, ONL
N
0 are employed in the non




0 are unemployed. Wmin is the minimum wage, which is
assumed to be set in net, take-home basis. The initial (pre-reform) social security
contribution (or, more specifically, its pure tax component) is assumed to be To, and W0
is the equilibrium wage rate in the non covered sector. (This wage rate is obtained from
the intersection of the rectangular hyperbola yy and the demand schedule for the
uncovered sector L(N)). It is clear from this figure that the expected wage rate of those
employed in the protected sector and for the unemployed - -that is, for the pool of
applicants for protected sector jobs - -is equal to W0.
         Consider now the effects – on both wages and employment-- of a social security
reform that, as was the case in Chile, results in the reduction in the social security tax.
This case is again depicted in Figure 5, under the maintained assumption that the non-
labor factors of production are fixed in their sector of origin and that the supply for labor
is inelastic. The new tax is assumed to be T1.  As a result of the reduction in the payroll
tax component the cost of hiring labor in the covered sector declines and, thus,,
employment in this sector increases to L1
P.   The wage rate in the non-covered sector is
now determined by the intersection between its demand for labor and the new wage rate
equilibrium schedule (y’y’), and is equal to W1;  employment in the uncovered sector
declines to L1
N.  It is not possible, however to establish a priori what happens to
unemployment. This will basically depend on the extent of the reduction in the tax
component of social security contributions, as well as on the values of the elasticities of
demand for labor in the covered and uncovered sectors.  Formally, the effect of the
reduction of the tax component on the non-covered sector wages rate will be:26
(7)  d log Wn =(1/∆ ) [(U/(Lc + U)) η c (U/F) + (Ln/F) η c(U/(Lc + U)) ] (T/(1 + T)) dlog T.
where, η c is the demand elasticity of labor in the covered sector, η n is the demand
elasticity of  labor with in the non-covered sector, and,
(8)                    ∆  = { (U/F) - (Ln/F) η C(U/(LC + U))} > 0.
Equation (7), then, is negative, indicating that, under our assumptions, reductions in the
tax on labor in the covered sector (d log T < 0 ) will always result in an increase in the
clearing wage rate for those workers not covered by the formal social security system.  On
the other hand, the effect of the reform on the total number of unemployed will be:
(9)                      d U = -{(U/∆ ) η c(Ln/F) { 1 + (U/(Lc + U)) η n }} (T/(1 + T)) dlog T .
As figure 8 indicated, it is not possible to sign this expression a priori. This means that, in
principle, in this setting a social security reform that reduces the tax on labor in the
covered  sector could generate either an increase or a decline in the number of
unemployed in the  economy.  According to equation (9), however, the sign of d U will
depend on the value of the elasticity of demand for labor in the non-covered sector. More
specifically, if |η n | < (Lc + U)/U, then the social security reform will result in a reduction
in the number of unemployed.
        If the assumptions regarding sector specificity of capital and inelastic labor supply
are relaxed, the computations become somewhat more complicated and the ambiguous
results become more likely.  If, on the other hand, capital is reallocated the results will
depend on the capital-labor ratio. If, as is likely to be the case in developing countries, the
formal (covered) sector is capital intensive, the probability that the reform will increase
the number of unemployed is even higher. With an inelastic F, wages in the non-covered
sector will still increase after the reform.  Interestingly enough, even under the
assumption of an elastic labor supply, the model developed here can still provide an
estimate of the impact of the reforms on employment. This would be, in fact, the way to27
interpret equation (9), under this set of assumptions (of course, with a negative sign).  In
the Appendix to this paper we present a more general version of the model, with an
elastic supply for labor, endogenous prices and capital mobility.  There we show that the
basic results presented in this section follow under that more general set of assumptions.
In spite of its simplicity, this model captures quite well the most salient
institutional aspects of the Chilean case, and can be used to simulate, under suitable
parameter values, the effects of the pension reform on Chile’s labor markets. In order to
perform this simulation we require estimates of the relevant elasticities, the initial number
of employed in each sector, the initial number of unemployed, and the initial and final
values of the tax component of the social security contributions.
Table 5 contains the parameter values used in the calculations. The basic values of
the parameters correspond to 1981, the year the reforms were launched. In order to make
the calculations as sharp as possible, it has been assumed that under the old
pay-as-you-go system, the complete contribution was perceived as a tax, while under the
new capitalization system one half of the contribution is seen as a deferred contribution.
That is, we are assuming that the tax component of the new system is only one half of the
required contribution, or 5% of wages.  This latter assumptions is consistent with recent
estimates made by Torche and Wagner (1997), who used an equalizing wage differentials
approach to estimate the proportion of the contribution to social security that workers
considered a tax.
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Additionally, as may be seen from Table 5, we have assumed a range of values for
the two elasticities of demand for labor (Coeymans and Mundlak 1993). This allows us
to simulate ranges for the effects of the reforms on wages in the non-covered sector and
on employment creation. The results obtained from the simulations, under the
assumptions used to derive equations (8) and (9), are presented in Table 6.  As may be
seen, under the parameters constellation considered in this section, we estimate that the
Chilean pension reform generated, with other things given, an increase in non-covered
sector wages ranging from 3.7 to 6.2 percent, and a net increase in employment ranging
from 61 to 96 thousand jobs. If it is assumed that labor supply is inelastic with respect to28
social security contributions, this effect is equivalent to a decline in the rate of
unemployment (with all other things given) ranging), at the time of the reform, from 2.0
to 3.1 percentage points.  These results should be interpreted as providing an upper
bound estimate of the effects of the reforms on unemployment.  This is because they
have been obtained under the assumption that the supply for labor is not affected by the
reform itself.  Using the general model developed in the appendix, in Edwards and
Edwards (1999) we estimated that, when there is a labor supply response, the social
security reforms contributed to reducing unemployment in 0.7 to 1.1 percentage points.
VI.   Labor Market Regulations and Unemployment Persistence:  An Aggregate
Analysis
In the preceding sections we have concentrated on the most important
microeconomic aspects of Chile’s labor reforms, and we have analyzed the way in which
new legislation introduced in 1980, 1981 and 1990 affected job security, collective
bargaining, strike activity, payroll taxes, and take-home wages.  In this section, we take a
different perspective, and we use time series aggregate data to analyze the way in which
the reforms affected the degree of labor market flexibility and the equilibrium level of
unemployment.  This is an important issue since, as stated in the introduction, two of the
explicit goals of the reforms were to increase labor market responsiveness to shocks, and
to reduce the long run equilibrium level of unemployment.
A number of authors have argued that the degree of rigidities embedded in labor
legislation will affect the equilibrium level of unemployment.  This has been, for
example, the view of many authors that have attempted to explain the high degree of
unemployment in Europe during the last decade and a half, and has been expressed in
particularly strong terms by the OECD Jobs Study  (OECD, 1994).
Most attempts at testing this general proposition have been based on comparisons
across countries with different regulatory environments, and in particular on comparisons
between the countries of Europe and the United States.  The general view on these
matters has recently been stated by Nickell (1997, p.55) as follows:  “Here is the received
                                                                                                                                                                            
32   They estimated wage equations on a data set with over 21,000 observations in 1990.  Unfortunately that29
wisdom: The European job market is rigid and inflexible: Result: high unemployment.
The North American job market is dynamic and flexible: Result: low unemployment.”
Nickell (1997), however, concludes that the received wisdom is only partially right, and
that some (but not all) labor market regulations in Europe cause higher unemployment.
Blanchard and Katz (1997) take a similar view, and argue that restrictions to firing
workers increase unemployment duration and workers’ flows, but do not “necessarily led
to a higher rate of unemployment (p. 59).”
In analyzing the effects of labor market regulations, some authors have focused on
their effects on the dynamics of unemployment, and in particular on its degree of
persistence.  For example, in their analysis of European and U.S. unemployment patterns,
Blanchard and Summers (1986) argue that due to greater rigidities, and in particular
because of the more active role of unions, unemployment has been more persistent in
Europe than in the United States.  They argue further that the extent of unemployment
persistence is affected by the state of the economy, with unemployment being more
persistent in “bad times” than in “good times.”
Because of the major reforms of the last thirty years, Chile provides a unique
opportunity for analyzing the effects of changing labor regulations on unemployment and
other labor market outcomes within a particular country.  If the “regulations hypothesis”
is correct, we would expect that Chile’s labor market would exhibit a greater degree of
flexibility and fluidity in the post reforms period.  In this section we use aggregate data to
explore this proposition.  In particular, we follow Blanchard and Summers (1986) and
focus on the degree of unemployment persistence as a measure of labor market flexibility.
According to the Blanchard-Summers model, unemployment persistence is a direct result
of the existence of insiders and outsiders in the labor market.  To the extent that
membership to the insiders’ “group” is related to those workers that are currently
employed, unemployment will tend to exhibit persistence.  This is because, under most
plausible objective functions, members of the “insiders group” will negotiate labor
contracts that protect their status, tending, thus, to perpetuate the employment
                                                                                                                                                                            
data set (known as CASEN) is only available since the 1990s.30
(unemployment) status quo.
33  This perpetuation of current conditions will, in turn, be
translated into unemployment persistence.
Traditional labor market regulations – and in particular employment protection
legislation and rules granting significant power to unions -- play an important role in this
framework. First, as pointed out by Blanchard and Summers themselves, powerful unions
will have a greater capacity to manipulate contracts in a way that will protect the interest
of their members currently holding jobs.  Within the context of this framework we would
expect that, to the extent that labor market reforms alter the “membership rules” and
increase the degree of labor market flexibility, there should be a reduction in the degree of
unemployment persistence in the post reform period.  In the extreme case when the
reforms abolish the distinction between insiders and outsiders all together, unemployment
persistence will tend to disappear.
34  Second, the existence of job protection, such as
Chile’s 1966 “inamovilidad” law, will help restrict “membership” to those currently
holding a job, and protected by the legislation.  This possible (positive) effect of  job
security on aggregate unemployment, may however be offset by the fact that this type of
legislation discourages firings.  At the end, whether job protection affects aggregate
unemployment positively or negatively is, as so many things in this area, an empirical
issue.
We begin our analysis of unemployment persistence in Chile by considering a
simple process that relates the current rate of unemployment to its lagged value and to the
deviations of the rate of growth of the GDP from its long term trend:
(10) u t = α  + β  u t – 1 +  γ  (g t – g*t ) + ε  t ,
 
  where u t is the aggregate rate of unemployment in period t, g t  is the rate of growth of
real GDP in period t, g*t  is the trend rate of growth of GDP, α , β  and γ  are parameters,
and ε  t is an error term.  At this point we do not restrict the characteristics of ε  t and allow
                                                          
33 See Blanchard and Summers (1986) for a formal derivation of this proposition.
34  Notice, however, that there are some theoretical models that predict that more powerful unions and more
centralized bargaining systems will lower the rate of aggregate unemployment.  See Flanagan (1999) for a
review of this literature.31
it, in principle, to follow alternative processes.  The presence of the GDP growth gap
distinguishes equation (10) from the simple processes estimated by Blanchard and
Summers (1986) for the U.S. and a group of European countries.
35  We would expect γ  to
be negative, reflecting the fact that higher-than-trend rates of growth will result in a
decline in the rate of unemployment.  In the steady state, however, g will be equal to g*,
and the rate of unemployment will converge to its “natural” rate u*:
 
(11) u*  =  α  / (1 - β ).
 
  In this setting the degree of persistence in unemployment will be given by β :  the  higher
its value, the more persistent is unemployment.  In the limit, a value of one suggests the
presence of hysteresis, where past shocks will be permanently incorporated into the rate
of unemployment.  Furthermore, for given values of α , a higher degree of persistence
(that is, a higher β ) will also result in a higher natural rate of unemployment.
  The estimation of equation (10), using national unemployment rates for Chile for
1966-1997, yielded the following point estimates (t-statistics in parentheses):  α  = 1.16
(1.48); β  = 0.87 (10.7), and γ  = -0.32 (-4.7).  Interestingly enough, our estimated AR
coefficient is not very different from those estimated by Blanchard and Summers for the
U.K. (0.93) and the U.S. (0.90) for a much longer time period.
  There is no reason, however, to believe that these coefficients will be constant
through time.  In fact, to the extent that labor legislation experiences drastic changes, as
was the case Chile, we would expect that the coefficients in equation (10) would change
significantly through time.  More specifically, if the reforms achieved their intended goal
of increasing the degree of labor market flexibility, and, thus, reducing the degree of
persistence, we would expect that β  would be significantly lower during the post-reform
period.  Notice that this specification also allows us to investigate the more restrictive
hypothesis that the reforms affected the level of unemployment.  If, as has been argued by
the OECD (1994) among others, lower labor restrictions result in a lower equilibrium
                                                          
 
35  Blanchard and Summers (1986) fit ARMA(1,1) processes to their data for the U.K. and the U.S. (see
their tables 6, 7 and 10).  In our case, however, we found out that an augmented AR(1) process fits the32
level of unemployment we would expect that α  would also be lower in the post-reforms
period, as would u* = α  / (1 - β ).
36
  In Table 7 we present the results from χ
2  likelihood ratio stability tests for
equation (9).  As may be seen, the null hypothesis of no breakpoint in 1980 – the first
year of the reforms—is rejected at conventional levels.  The null that there were no
breakpoints in 1980 and 1990 is also rejected.  Finally, and interestingly enough, the null
of no breakpoint in 1974 (the first year of the military dictatorship) cannot be rejected at
conventional levels.
  In Table 8 we present results from the estimation of (9) using dummy variables
that allow for changes in coefficients α  and β  for the period after the military labor reform
was implemented.  Dumref is a dummy variable that takes the value of one from 1980
through 1997, and a value of zero otherwise.  As before, (g t – g*t ) was computed as the
difference between the actual rate of growth of real GDP, and the long term trend growth
of GDP calculated using the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) procedure.  The most important
results in this table are:  First, until 1979 unemployment indeed exhibited a considerable
degree of persistence.  In fact, according to equations (10.3) and (10.4) it is not possible
to reject the hypothesis of hysteresis.
37  Second, the degree of unemployment persistence
declined significantly after the reforms were implemented.  The coefficient of the reforms
dummy interacted with lagged unemployment is significantly negative, with a point
estimate ranging between –0.15 and –0.28.  Third, the estimate of the reform dummy for
the constant term is not significant, and while it is negative in one of the regressions, in
the other it is positive.  And fourth, the coefficient of deviations of growth from its long
term trend is always significantly negative, with a very stable coefficient of around –0.3.
  We interpret these results as providing some evidence in support of the hypothesis
that the Chilean labor reforms increased the degree of labor market flexibility, as defined
by a decline in the degree of unemployment persistence.  At the same time, these break
                                                                                                                                                                            
Chilean data better.
36  We thank Steve Nickell for suggesting estimating a unemployment dynamic equation, constraining the
natural rate to be constant.  However, the results obtained from this formulation were highly unstable and
difficult to interpret.33
point regressions do not support the view that the reforms, of and by themselves, reduced
the equilibrium level of unemployment (there is no clear cut effect on estimated the value
of α ).
  Although the very small number of observations does not allow us to look in
detail for multiple break points, we can still investigate for the presence of two break
points – one corresponding to each reform – in the unemployment dynamics equation.
Table 9 contains the results from such a regression. Dum8090 is a dummy variable that
takes a value of 1 for period 1980-90 and zero otherwise, while Dum9097 takes a value of
one during 1991-97 and zero for the rest of the period.  The results obtained tend to
confirm those reported above.  While the dummy for the constant is barely significant the
estimated coefficient for both interactive dummies indicate a decline in the degree of
labor market persistence in the period following the reforms.
         The regressions reported in tables 8 and 9, allow for at most two discrete break
points in Chile’s unemployment process.  This limited number of breaks is the result of
both the small number of observations, and of the fact that break point models are not
able to handle a large number of jumps (Hamilton 1994).  In principle, however, changes
in the degree of persistence may be gradual and smooth, rather than discrete.  In order to
investigate this possibility we estimated equation (10) using a stochastic time varying
parameters technique (Hamilton 1994).  The specific model estimated is:
 
(12)    u t = α  t  + β  t  u t – 1 +  γ  (g t – g*t ) + ε  t ,
(13)   α  t  =  α  t – 1 + ξ  t
(14)     β  t = β  t – 1 +  ζ  t ,
where ξ  t and ζ  t are zero-mean and constant variance error terms.  In equation (12), then,
both the constant and the AR term are allowed to vary through time, while the coefficient
of the growth gap term is assumed to be constant.  Figure 6 depicts the estimated values
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
37 According to both ADF and Phillips-Perron tests it is not possible to reject the hypothesis of unit root.
These tests, however, have very low power in the presence of break points in the series.  Moreover, their
reliability with only 31 observations is low.34
of alpha and beta.
38  As may be seen, these time varying coefficient estimates indicate,
very strongly, that the autoregressive term in the unemployment dynamics equation
declined after the labor reforms were implemented in Chile.  These estimates suggest that
already one year after the reform had been implemented the point estimate of the
persistence coefficient had declined by 0.1, and that three years after the reforms it had
experienced a drop to almost one half of its pre reform level.
39  Interestingly enough,
these Kalman filter estimates suggest that after increasing sharply during 1974-82, the
constant coefficient alpha also experienced a deep decline in the post reform period.
Moreover, according to these estimations the steady state equilibrium rate of
unemployment also declined – although not by too much -- after the reforms were
implemented.  See Figure 7 for the estimated long run rate of unemployment calculated
from these equations.
How much did each of the reform components -- job security and collective
bargaining, in particular -- contribute to the improvement of labor market outcomes?  The
importance of this question stems from the fact that, as noted in sections III and IV, the
effect of these reforms on the aggregate rate of unemployment is theoretically ambiguous.
We address this issue by analyzing whether our job –protection and collective bargaining
indexes can explain the evolution of unemployment persistence through time. More
specifically, we ran regressions of the following form:
(15) Persistence t = γ  0 + γ  1 log (Collective Index) t + γ  2 log (Protection Index) t + ε  t .
Where Persistence is defined as the time-varying (Kalman Filter) estimate of β  reported
in Figure 7.  A higher value of this variable denotes a more sluggish rate of
unemployment, and a less flexible labor market.  Collective Index and Protection Index
are indexes that measure the degree of restrictiveness (and centralization) of collective
                                                          
38   In order not to lose some valuable degrees of freedom we extended the unemployment series back until
1960, using the Greater Santiago Area unemployment data to calculate national unemployment rates for
1960-65.
39   In order to sharpen the visual presentation, estimated coefficients are depicted without the standard
errors.  These however show that zero was clearly outside of the 95% confidence interval in 1966-79.  After
the reforms, however, the value zero belonged to the interval.35
bargaining and union legislation, and the cost of job protection legislation respectively.
This approach to investigating the (possible) effects of the reforms on aggregate
unemployment can be though of, as a time series extension of the cross-country tests
implemented by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) for a group of industrialized
countries.
40
In the actual estimation of equation (15), we used four alternative definitions for
the Collective Index:  (1) The index of the degree of centralization of the bargaining
process constructed in Section IV.  This is called Bargaining Index, and as explained, a
higher value means a more centralized process.  (2) The index of union activities, also
constructed in Section IV and presented in Figure 4 above.  A higher value of the index
means a higher level of strike activity and/or a higher average cost per strike.  We called
this index Union Index.  (3) An index that combines, as a simple average, the previous
two indexes of centralization and strike activities.  This index was called Collective1.
And (4) a smoothed version of the Collective1 Index.  The Hodrick-Prescott procedure
was used to smooth the series.   This index was called Collective.
 With respect to the Protection Index, we used two alternative measures:  First, we
used the index on the cost of job security legislation constructed in Section III, and
presented in Figure 5.  And second, we used the cost of dismissing an individual with 20
years tenure in the firm (cost-twenty).
The results obtained from the estimation of equation (15) are presented in Table
10, and are quite interesting.   First, the coefficients of the indexes the degree of
centralization of the bargaining process are always positive.  Moreover, the coefficients of
the log of Collective, Collective1 and Bargaining are highly significant.  This suggests
that a more centralized collective bargaining process (that is, one that gives greater power
to unions) has increased the degree of unemployment persistence.  Another way of saying
it, these results suggest strongly, that the reforms to the wage bargaining process
increased the degree of flexibility and fluidity of the labor market.  Second, the
coefficients for the job Protection Index are negative, with rather small point estimates (in
                                                          
40 In that study the authors used pooled cross section and time series data to estimate estimated structural
equations of unemployment for a group of 19 countries.  In the second stage of the analysis they regressed36
absolute value).  In only two of the five regressions (15.1) and (15.4) they are significant
at conventional levels.  This results are somewhat ambiguous, and suggest that job
security had either no effect on aggregate unemployment – a result consistent, for
example, with Pages and Montenegro’s (1999) results for the urban Santiago area --, or
that it had a small negative effect.
The results presented in Table 10 can be used to estimate the actual contribution
of these reforms to the reduction in unemployment persistence in Chile.  As the
calculations reported in Table 11 show, the estimates in equation (15.1) suggest that our
model explains most of the reduction in persistence between 1966-1970 and 1993-97.
These estimates can also be used, in conjunction with the Kalman Filter estimates of the
dynamics of unemployment (equation 12), to gain some insights on the extent to which
the reforms affected the long run rate of unemployment.  For example, the results from
equation (15.2) suggest that, while the job security reform had no effect on long run
natural rate of unemployment, the collective bargaining reform reduced the long term rate
of unemployment in 1.5 percentage points.
41
To summarize, the results presented in this section indicate that in the post
reforms period, Chile’s labor market experienced, both a reduction in persistence and in
the natural rate of unemployment.  Our analysis also indicates that while, the collective
bargaining reform contributed greatly to increasing flexibility and lowering
unemployment, the reform to job security had a either a negligible, or a negative, effect
on these variables.
VII. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have analyzed the overall process of labor reforms in Chile from
the period of the military (1973-89) to the present.  The analysis has centered on the three
fundamental aspects of these reforms:  (a) the reduction in the extent of job security;  (b)
                                                                                                                                                                            
the coefficients from the unemployment equations on indexes that capture the most important properties
bargaining institutions in each country.
41   This calculation was made by comparing the average estimated u* for 1966-70 with a hypothetical u*
for 1993-97.  The latter is computed as the estimated average α  for that period, divided by (1 - β *), where
β * is calculated as the 1966-70 β , corrected by the estimated effect of the reforms.  These, in turn, are
obtained from equation (15.2).37
the decentralization of collective bargaining, and the related reduction in unions’ power;
and (3) the privatization of social security.  We concluded that the reforms accomplished
the following objectives:  (1) They reduced the (cash) cost to firms of dismissing workers.
We reached this conclusion after analyzing the evolution of several indexes of the cost of
job security.  We argue, however that, from an international comparative perspective,
Chile continues to have a relatively restrictive job security legislation.  (2) The reforms
reduced the degree of centralization of the wage bargaining process.  They also reduced
the power of labor unions, and the cost of labor conflicts.  Our comparative analysis
suggests clearly that Chile moved from institutions based on the European tradition to a
U.S.-type decentralized model.  And (3), the social security reform resulted in a
significant reduction in payroll taxes.
Our analysis also suggests that (some of the components of) the reforms had an
impact on both the dynamic and long term aggregate level of unemployment.  Our
conclusions in this area can be summarized as follows:  (1)  Simulation exercises based
on the model developed in Section V suggest that the social security reform contributed
to reducing unemployment in about 1 to 1.5 percentage points.  (2)  The regression
analysis presented in Section VI -- including the Kalman Filter estimates of
unemployment dynamic equations -- indicate that in the post reforms period, Chile’s
labor market experienced both a reduction in persistence and in the natural rate of
unemployment.  (3) The reductions in unemployment persistence, and in the natural rate
of unemployment, appear to have been largely the result of the reforms to the collective
bargaining process.  And (4), the reform to job security legislation appears to have had a
negligible – or maybe even a small negative – effect on the aggregate rate of
unemployment.  It is important to emphasize, however, that this last finding does not
mean that job security provisions have no effects whatsoever.  In fact, Pages and
Montenegro (1999) have recently presented persuasive results suggesting that this
particular reform had an important effect on the level and composition of employment.
Chile’s labor reforms have not been without critics.  Some observers have, in fact,
argued that the market-oriented reforms and, in particular the new legislation on job
security, has caused an increased level of precariousness in the job market.  There is,38
however, no evidence in support that the reforms – either labor or other – affected social
conditions negatively.  In fact, between the mid 1980s and the mid 1990s Chile
experienced a very dramatic decline in the poverty headcount.  Also, according to the
World Bank (1997) the Gini coefficient moved from 0.470 in 1969 to 0.455 in 1996.
42
                                                          
42   The World Bank (1997) calculations also indicate that the Gini coefficient experienced a significant
increase between 1985 and 1990.39
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APPENDIX
Social Security Reform and the Labor Market:
A Segmented-Market Model
In this appendix we provide a generalization of the model presented in Section V.
assume that, as is the case in many developing and transitional economies, the labor
market is segmented.  There is a “modern” or “covered” sector subject to a minimum
wage and to social security coverage, and an “informal” or “unprotected” sector with no
social security coverage, and competitively determined wages.  With other things equal,
workers will rather be employed in the “protected” sector.  There are not enough jobs in
that sector; individuals that apply for a job in the modern sector face a probability (p) of
obtaining it, and a probability (1-p) of being unemployed.  In equilibrium, and under the
assumption of risk neutrality, the wage rate obtained in the informal segment is equal to
the expected (take home) wage rate in the protected sector.  We further assume that every
period employment in the modern sector turns over fully, so that the probability of getting
a job there is equal to the ratio of openings to applicants.
43
We also assume that prior to the reform workers in the protected sector are subject
to a payroll tax – whose purpose is to fund the social security system—equal to T1.  We
also assume that there is a disconnect between social security contributions and benefits.
More specifically, we assume that social security contributions are considered by
individuals to be fully a tax.  Notice, however, that the analysis that follows would not be
affected by the assumption that only a fraction of the contribution was considered to be a
tax.  Workers employed in the modern sector receive a “take home” wage rate equal to
the minimum wage (Wmin ).  The cost of labor to firms operating in this sector is equal to
minimum wage rate plus the payroll tax.  Equations (A.1) - (A.4) describe the wage
determination process in this economy.  Equation (A.1) establishes that in equilibrium the
wage rate in the informal sector (WI) is equal to the expected (net of taxes) wage rate in
the modern sector E (W 
N 
M).  According to equation (A.2) the probability of finding a job
in the modern sector is equal to the ratio of openings – that is employment in that sector44
(L M) – to applicants.  The latter is given by the sum of openings plus the total number of
unemployed (L M + U).  It is assumed, for simplicity, that the unemployed received an
income equal to S.  Equation (A.3) says that the cost of labor in the modern sector is
equal to the minimum wage inclusive of the payroll tax ( T1).  In equation (A.4) we
present the demand for labor equations in the modern and informal sectors.  P M and P I
are good prices in each sector, f (  ) and g(  ) are physical marginal productivity of labor
functions, and K M and K I are the stock of capital used in the modern and informal sector.
(A.1) WI = E (W 
N 
M) = p Wmin + (1 – p) S
(A.2) p  = [LM / (LM + U)]
(A.3) W M = W min (1 + T 1)
(A.4) W M = P M f (L M , K M );   W I = P I  g (L I, K I ).
Equation (A.5) is the resource constraint in the labor market, and establishes that
employment in the modern sector, plus employment in the informal sector plus
unemployment has to be equal to total labor supply (L s ).  According to equation (A.6),
labor supply is a positive function of real wages; O represents “other” factors affecting
the supply of labor.
44   Equation (A.7) define the aggregate price index and the aggregate
wage rate.   In order to simplify the analysis, in equation (A.8) we have assumed that the
modern sector corresponds to tradable goods and that, as a consequence, P M is given by
international prices (P M
*).
45  Equation (A.9) establishes that product prices in the
informal sector are a positive function of wages in that sector.  We further assume that an
increase in W I, will have a less than proportional effect on prices of goods produced in I.
(A.5) L M + L I + U = L S
                                                                                                                                                                            
43   This mechanism is similar to the one consider in migration models of the Harris-Todaro type.  In our
model, however, there is no migration.  The assumption of risk neutrality is not essential;  all the results will
follow if individuals have a constant degree of risk aversion.
44   We have abstracted from intertemporal issues.  Although our results will still go through in an explicit
intertemporal context, the computations would become significantly more complex.
45   This simplification allows us to maintain product prices in the modern sector constant.  An alternative
assumption, and one that would not affect the basic aspect of the analysis, is that the modern sector is45
(A.6) L S = h (W/P,O);   h’ > 0.
(A.7) P = P I 
β   P M 
( 1 - β  ) ;   W = W I 
θ   W M 
( 1 - θ  )
(A.8) P M = P M
* ;
(A.9) P I   =  z (W I);    z’ > 0.
Equation (A.10) is the resource constraint for capital, and says that the sum of
capital used in each sector has to equal the total stock of capital.  Equation (A.11) says
that the allocation of the capital stock across sectors will depend on the relative product
prices.  Notice that in order to simplify the computations, and to focus on  the issues at
hand, we have assumed that there is no net investment.
(A.10) K M + K I  = K
(A.11) K M = j (P M/P I);  K I  = v (P M/P I).
Formally, the model given by equations (A.1) - (A.11) can be solved to obtain the
effects of a social security reform, on a number of variables, including informal sector
wages (W I), the volume of unemployment (U), and product prices of in the informal
sector (P I).  In order to simplify the exposition, we follow a long tradition in international
trade theory – the Ricardo-Viner approach – and we assume that capital is fixed in its
sector of origin. We begin with the effects of changes in the tax component of the social
security contribution (d log T) on informal sector wages (d log WI):
(A.12)    d log W I =  ∆  
-1 { - [α  U ( U / ( L M + U )) ( 1 / η  M )]
-  [( U / ( L M + U ) α  M ( 1 / η  M )]} ( T 1 / ( 1 + T1) )  d log T.
Where,
(A.13)   ∆   =  - α  U  -  [α  I  ( U / ( L M + U )) ( 1 / η  I  )  ( µ  - 1 )]
                                                                                                                                                                            
comprised of both tradable and non-tradable goods.  In this case, we would need a product market clearing
condition for modern sector goods.46
-  [( U / ( L M + U )) φ   (α  I  + µ  β  ) ].
α  I , α  M  and α  U  are the shares of employment in the informal sector, employment in the
modern sector, and unemployment in the labor resources constraint (A.5). η  I and η  M are
the inverse of the elasticities of the demand for labor with respect to wages in the I and M
sectors, respectively, and are negative.
46  φ   is the supply elasticity of labor, and is
positive. µ  is the elasticity of the price of informal sector goods (PI) with respect to the
wage rate in that sector, and is greater than zero and smaller than one.  It follows from
equation (A.13), then, that ∆  is negative.  Consequently, according to equation (A.12), the
following result holds.
(d log W I / d log T) < 0.
This means that a social security reform that reduces the pay roll tax, will unambiguously
generate an increase in the wage rate in I, the sector that is not covered by the by the
social security system.  Notice that, by construction, net (take home) wages in the modern
sector are not affected by the reform.  This is because we have assumed that the minimum
wage is set in take-home bases, and that the reform does not affect it.  The more general
case where the reform generates an increase in net wages in the M sector is discussed
below.
The effect of the reform on aggregate unemployment (U), is given by:
(A.14)   d log U =  ∆  
-1 { (α  I  / η  I ) -  [α  I  ( U / ( L M + U )) ( 1 / η  I  ) ( 1 / η  M  ) ( µ  - 1 )]
   -  [( U / ( L M + U )) φ   (α  I  + µ  β  ) ( 1 / η  M  )]} (T 1 / (1+T1))  d log T.
The sign of equation (A.14) is undetermined.  It follows from this that within the
framework developed in this paper, a reduction in the payroll tax in the modern sector
will have an ambiguous effect on the number of unemployed.  Whether the level of
unemployment will increase or decline will depend on two basic factors:  the supply
                                                          
46   That is,  η  I = ( d log W I  ) /  ( d log L I ).47
elasticity of labor in the economy  -- parameter φ  in equation (A.14) --; and the demand
elasticity of labor demand in the informal sector.  The more elastic is the supply for labor
and the more inelastic is the demand for labor in the informal sector, the more likely it is
that the reform will result in an increase in the level of unemployment.
Equation (A.15) gives the effect of the reform on product prices in the informal
sector, and is positive:
(A.15)           d log P I =  ∆  
-1 { - ( U / ( L M + U ))  (α  M / η  M )
                                -  α  U  ( U / ( L M + U )) ( 1 / η  M  )} ( T 1 / ( 1 + T1 ))  d log T.
The results in equations (A.12) – (A.15) assume that there is no change in the
take-home wage in the modern sector.  In Chile, however, the government mandated an
increase in take-home wages equal to 10 percent, for those that opted for the privatized
regime.   In the context of our model, an increase in the take-home wage in the sector
covered by social security can be modeled as an exogenously determined increase in the
minimum wage rate.  Formally speaking, then, this more general policy package
corresponds to a situation where both the minimum wage (W min ) and the payroll tax,
change (in opposite directions).  In this case the change in the wage rate in the informal
sector will be given by:
(A.16) d log W I =  ∆  
-1 {[ - [α  U ( U / ( L M + U )) ( 1 / η  M )]
-  [( U / ( L M + U ) α  M ( 1 / η  M )]] { T 1 / ( 1 + T1) )  d log T
  + d log W min }.
The change in the level of employment, in turn, will now be given by:
(A.17)   d log U =  ∆  
-1 { (α  I  / η  I ) -  [α  I  ( U / ( L M + U )) ( 1 / η  I  ) ( 1 / η  M  ) ( µ  - 1 )]
- [( U / ( L M + U )) φ   (α  I  + µ  β  ) ( 1 / η  M  )]} {(T 1 / (1+T1))  d log T
+   d log W min}.48







Job Security Payroll Taxes
Initial Conditions
1931-1965
Tripartite system of collective
bargaining and conflict resolution.
1931 labor code focuses on conflict
resolution.  While the legislation
favored collective bargaining at the
firm level, and this form of
negotiations was dominant, the
mechanisms of conflict resolution
projected negotiations beyond the
enterprise.  With time, sector-wide
negotiations spread throughout the
economy.
Dismissal without expression of cause
with a month’s notice.
Severance payment of a month’s
wage per year of tenure for “white
collar workers.
The main component of payroll taxes are social
security contributions. Chile started a Social
Security System in 1924, building from a set of
privately established pensions systems that
covered specific groups of workers or sectors of
economic activity.  These programs finance
retirement, invalidity and family survivor
benefits, a public health care system, the
payment of family allowances, and an
unemployment subsidy.  In addition, there was a










Dismissals require expression of
“just” cause, or severance payment of
a month’s wage per year of tenure
In spite of very high nominal contribution rates,
by 1970 the public sector spent 20.5 percent of
its budget to cover the deficits in the health and








Decree Law 670 of October 1974
substituted the earlier legislation that
defined the tripartite commissions,
giving them a consultative character.
They were understood to be a
transition mechanism, while a new
policy towards the labor market was







Dismissal without expression of cause
reinstated in 1978 for all new hires.
Employers pay a severance of a
month’s wage per year of tenure to all
dismissed workers, unless there is
“just cause,” which includes
“economic cause.”
A number of partial changes brought down
contributions from a 60 percent at their peak in
1974, to the order of 33 percent in 1980. Rates
varied  according to the specific plan at which
an employee was affiliated, but all the plans
were guaranteed by the state.
For example, in 1976, the 1% contribution





Union affiliation becomes voluntary.
Decentralized collective bargaining.
Labor negotiations opened to market
forces. Strikes without job
guarantees after sixty days.
minimum wage
setting
Starting in 1981, dismissals of any
worker, new or previously hired, can
take place without expression of
cause, and as long as severance is
paid.
In 1980, a reform lowered social security
contributions to just above 20 percent (10 %
towards retirement, 7%  towards health and
about 3%  towards dissability).
New entrants to the labor force would contribute49
No intervention of the government in
the affairs of unions or the collective
bargaining process, except for a
wage floor guaranteed by law.
The wage floor was eliminated in
1982, and as a byproduct, the
necessary conditions to replace
striking workers were eroded.
Severance payments are open to
negotiations.  In the absence of an
explicit agreement the minimum
severance would be a month wages
per year of tenure with a 5 months
ceiling.
A 1984 reform established that the
minimum severance agreed by the
parties could not be less than the
severance established by law.
Furthermore, “economic cause” for
dismissal is not “just cause” anymore.
to a new old-age program based on a mandated
individualized savings plan, to be managed by
private administrators (AFPs). Old contributors
could to opt out of the traditional pay-as-you-go
system. In the case of health care contributions,
both old contributors and new entrants were
given the choice to opt out of the public system
(FONASA) and use the 7 percent towards a
health care insurance policy provided by an
authorized private health insurer (ISAPRES).
A basic pension, the unemployment insurance,
and the family allowances programs would be





The new law eliminated the sixty
days period for the legal strike,
which allowed employers to dismiss
striking workers without severance.
The new law also reinstated stricter
conditions for workers replacements
in case of strike
Labor negotiations can take place at
the sector level if both workers and
employers agree to it.
minimum wage
setting
Dismissals require an expression of
“cause”. Severance of one month
wages per year of tenure applies to
dismissals with “economic cause.”
Severance would be paid with a 20%
surcharge if the employer cannot
prove an alleged “economic cause.”
No severance obligation in case of
dismissals with “just cause.”
Dismissal ceiling on severance
payment raised to 11 month wages.
Separate treatment for domestic
workers based on individualized
accounts.50
TABLE 2
Employment Protection in Chile, Rest of Latin America, Selected European Countries,
and the United States in the mid 1980s*







10 10 29 31.5
2. Tenure-based
severance (3 years)
4 1 22 33 7
3. Probationary
Period
17.5 20.2 20.8 37
4.  Severance at 20
years
26 18.5 21.6 37
5. Reinstatement 23 21.3 13 23
6. Overall
Protection Index
11.5 12.8 22.7 37
See text for details.
The indexes rank countries from most protective (1) to least protective (37).
Based on detailed data from Marquez and Pages (1998).51
TABLE 3
The Nature of Collective Bargaining:




1970-73 1985-89 1995-96 1980 1994 1980 1994
1. Union
Density
34.7% 8% 15% 53% 40% 22% 16%
2. Bargaining
Level
2+ 1 1 2+ 2 1 1
3. Bargaining
Coordination
2+ 1 1 2+ 2+ 1 1
4. Federation
Involvement
4 1 1+ 2+ 2 1 1
5. Government
Intervention
32 1 2 + 2 + 1 1
Categories defined by Flanagan (1999)
Notes
Union Density = Proportion of wage and salary workers who are union members.
Bargaining Level = (1) Plant-level bargaining; (2) Industry level bargaining; (30 Centralized bargaining.
Bargaining Coordination = Range is from uncoordinated bargaining (=1) to highly coordinated bargaining
(3).
Federation Involvement = Union and/or employer federations are: (1) Uninvolved in setting wages in any of
the subsequent ways; (2) Participate in formulation of wage demands for all affiliates; (3) Negotiate non-
wage benefits; (4) Negotiate a part of the wage agreement (e.g. cost-of-living-adjustement); (5) Represent
affiliates in mediation with centralized ratification; (6) Represent affiliates in arbitration; (7) Negotiate
national wage agreement without peace obligation; (8) Negotiate national wage agreement with peace
obligation.
Government Involvement = (1) Sets minimum wage only; (2) Mandates adjustments; (3) Role in tripartite
negotiations.52




























1960-70 279 9.9 2,549 22 n.a.
1985 42 1.2 n.a. 21 8
1986 41 1.1 n.a. 15 5
1987 81 2.0 n.a. 14 8
1988 72 1.7 1,215 14 7
1989 101 2.3 2,956 16 13
1990 176 3.9 1,393 15 18
1991 224 4.9 3,276 12 23
1992 247 5.1 1,355 12 17
1993 224 4.4 1,393 12 14
1994 196 3.8 1,592 13 10
1995 187 3.6 1,872 12 17
1996 183 3.5 1,282 10 18
Source:  Feres (1997), Instituto Libertad y Desarrollo (1997).53
Table 5
Parameters Values to Simulate Labor Market Effects
Of Pension Reform
PARAMETER PARAMETER VALUE
F (Thousand of people) 3,700
Lc (Thousand of People) 1,850
LN (Thousand of People) 1,450
U (Thousand of People) 400
ηηηη  N -0.5 / -0.7
ηηηη  C -0.4 / -0.6
T 0 0.26
T 1 0.05
Source:  Edwards and Edwards (1991),  Coeymans and Mundlak (1993).54
Table 6:  Simulation Results
High Case Scenario Low Case Scenario




6.2 percent 3.7 percent
Source:  see text55
Table 7: Break-Point Test for Unemployment Dynamics Equation








   P-values in parenthesis56
TABLE  8:   Unemployment Dynamics Equations

























dumref      - -0.858
(-1.215)
  - 1.547
(1.001)





2 0.824 0.833 0.845 0.850
N3 1 3 0 3 1 3 1
D.W. 1.792 1.906 2.017 2.06757
Table 9:  Unemployment Persistence:  Testing for Two Breakpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
( g t – g *t ) -0.351025 0.064304 -5.458866 0.0000
UNEMP(-1) 1.067799 0.125893 8.481779 0.0000
DUM8090*UNEMP(-
1)
-0.467489 0.200750 -2.328713 0.0283
DUM9097*UNEMP(-
1)
-0.813395 0.385122 -2.112047 0.0448
C 0.073158 1.097515 0.066658 0.9474
DUMREF 4.211344 2.320239 1.815048 0.0815
R-squared 0.862895     Mean dependent var 8.900000
Adjusted R-squared 0.835474     S.D. dependent var 4.385354
S.E. of regression 1.778781     Akaike info criterion 4.161719
Number of
Observations 31
    Schwarz criterion 4.439265
Log likelihood -58.50665     F-statistic 31.46831
Durbin-Watson stat 1.956933     Prob(F-statistic) 0.00000058
TABLE 10 :    Unemployment Persistence and Labor Market Reform 
a
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      _ -0.125
(-1.840)
      _ -0.180
(-1.370)
Log (Cost-Twenty)      _ -0.107
(-1.824)
     _ -0.118
(-2.364)
      _
AR(1)      _   0.512      _       _       _
DW     1.58    2.03    1.65    1.54     1.58
R
2     0.89    0.86    0.91    0.85     0.36
N     31      31      31       31       31
Notes:  t-statistics in parenthesis
a.  A dummy variable that took the value of one during the years of the military regime
was also included.59
TABLE 11:  Explaining Changes in Unemployment Persistence
Change between 1966-70 and 1993-97
Change in Persistence Coefficient              - 0.468
Change attributed to collective bargaining reform - 0.480
Change attributed to job protection reform              + 0.066
Unexplained change in persistence              - 0.054
Source:  Authors’ calculations.  See text for details.60
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Figure 2: Rate of Unemployment and Unemployment Duration62
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Figure 5:  The Labor Market Effect of Pension Reform65
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